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Abstract 
Kleinberg (1999) describes a novel procedure for efficient search in a dense 
hyper-linked environment, such as the world wide web.  The procedure exploits 
information implicit in the links between pages so as to identify patterns of connectivity 
indicative of “authorative sources”.  At a more general level, the trick is to use this 
second-order link-structure information to rapidly and cheaply identify the knowledge-
structures most likely to be relevant given a specific input.  I shall argue that Kleinberg’s 
procedure is suggestive of a new, viable, and neuroscientifically plausible solution to at 
least (one incarnation of) the so-called “Frame Problem” in cognitive science viz the 
problem of explaining global abductive inference.  More accurately, I shall argue that 
Kleinberg’s procedure suggests a new variety of “fast and frugal heuristic” (Gigerenzer 
and Todd (1999)) capable of pressing maximum utility from the vast bodies of 
information and associations commanded by the biological brain.  The paper thus takes 
up the challenge laid down by Fodor ((1983)(Ms)).  Fodor depicts the problem of global 
knowledge-based reason as the point source of many paradigmatic failings of 
contemporary computational theories of mind.  These failings, Fodor goes on to argue, 
cannot be remedied by any simple appeal to alternative (e.g. connectionist) modes of 
encoding and processing.  I shall show, however, that connectionist models can provide 
for one neurologically plausible incarnation of Kleinberg’s procedure.  The paper ends by 
noting that current commercial applications increasingly confront the kinds of challenge 
(such as managing complexity and making efficient use of vast data-bases) initially posed 




Introduction: The Frame Problem (maybe). 
 
 Back in 1969, McCarthy and Hayes coined the term “the frame problem.”  Since 
then the term has meant many things to many people, none of them good (for reviews, 
see Pylyshyn (1987), Ford and Hayes (1991), Ford and Pylyshyn (1996)).  What it meant 
to McCarthy and Hayes (1969), had to do largely with the updating of a system’s 
understanding of the world following activity by the system.  At the heart of this problem 
seems to lie a more general, and painfully intractable, puzzle.  It is the puzzle of finding 
the right stuff (information, data) to consider (update, or use in reasoning) at the right 
time.  The puzzle is intractable because in many cases there is no obvious sub-set of data 
or information to which we can reasonably restrict the search.  What is required, it often 
seems, is to be sensitive to the entire contents of the data-base, so as to make an inference 
to the best explanation, to choose an action, or to fix a belief, in a way that is maximally 
consistent with the global data-base.  This is the version of the frame problem that has 
Fodor “worried half to death” ((Ms) p. 37)), and that formed the pessimistic centerpiece 
of Fodor’s “first law of the non-existence of cognitive science” viz “the more global … a 
cognitive process is, the less anybody understands it” (Fodor (1983) p. 107). 
 
 To be clear, then, it is this problem – the problem of global abductive inference, 
as I’ll later cast it, that I shall be targeting in the text.  Whether this is indeed the frame 
problem as understood by McCarthy and Hayes doesn’t really matter.  At the very least, 
it is a problem that arises in the vicinity, and one that Fodor sees as potentially fatal to the 
ambitions of current cognitive science.   
 
 The discussion goes like this.  In section 1 (next) I isolate the particular aspect of 
the particular problem I want to target viz (roughly) the sub-problem of how to find the 
most relevant body of beliefs and information in a massive knowledge-base.  This 
problem, I shall show, constitutes a very large piece of Fodor’s puzzle.  In section 2, I 
display a potent and ingenious solution developed by Jon Kleinberg as a means of 
effective search in a dense hyper-linked-environment like the world wide web.  Section 3 
returns to cognitive science territory and shows first, that the simple appeal to 
connectionist modes of processing and storage does not solve so much as relocate 
Fodor’s problem, but second, that it relocates it in a way that suggests a neurally 
plausible incarnation of Kleinberg’s strategy.  I end (section 4) by briefly commenting on 
the wider significance of this result: that successful negotiation of the world wide web 
now raises many of the same problems that once confronted technology is thus 
increasingly well-positioned to recapitulate phylogeny.  
 
1. Commonsense, Modularity, and Global Abductive Inference. 
Cognitive science, according to Fodor, has had one – and only one – decent idea 
about how the mind works.  It is the idea, roughly, that 
What makes minds rational is their ability to perform computations on 
thoughts, where thoughts, like sentences, are assumed to be syntactically 
structured, and where “computation” means formal operations in the 
manner of Turing. 
Fodor (1998) p. 205. 
 
 Thus it is possible to understand how a merely physical system might be set up so 
as to abide by the rules of deductive inference: to token (to use Fodor’s own (op cit) 
example) P and Q, if and only if P is true and Q is true, to infer P from P & Q and so on.  
This, Fodor frequently reminds us, is a quite considerable advance; it is the heart of the 
classical computational theory of mind which (still according to Fodor) offers our only 
scientific foothold into the realms of normativity and rationality.  But it is a foothold that 
cannot, Fodor believes, get us to the top of the mountain.  In fact, it leaves us, 
infamously, stranded in the foothills of input systems and deductive inference, with the 
peaks of central processing, belief fixation, and global abductive inference (more on 
which shortly) towering tauntingly above us. 
 
 The trouble – all the trouble, it seems, with the exception of conscious awareness 
about which we shall remain silent – has to do with non-locality.  It is where processing, 
inference and recall need to be sensitive to properties not of single tokens, but of entire 
bodies of knowledge (“whole belief systems” in Fodor’s (op cit, p. 206) phase) that 
Turing style computation threatens to fall short.  There exist several sub-problems 
hereabouts, all of which turn, in somewhat different ways, on the need to be sensitive to 
non-local properties of neural representations – see e.g. Fodor (Ms) Ch. 2.  In this paper, 
I am concerned with just one (extremely central) such sub-problem: the challenge of 
tractable search and recall given an extremely large data-base.  It is this problem that is 
most intimately tied up with the issues concerning belief fixation and global abductive 
reasoning.  And it is this problem that Fodor typically glosses – for better or for worse – 
as the “frame problem in cognitive science.”  In Fodor’s own words: 
 
“The frame problem is a name for one aspect of the question how to 
reconcile a local notion of mental computation with the apparent holism 
of rational inference; in particular will the fact that information that is 
relevant to the optimal solution of a abductive problem can, in principle, 
come from anywhere in the network of one’s prior epistemic 
commitments.” 
 
Fodor (Ms) p. 41. 
 
 Here is one quick way to appreciate the worry.  Consider a system that knows a 
great deal (like us), and that receives a piece of apparent information from the world.  
Let’s imagine, to be concrete, that it’s visual system seems to be telling it that there is a 
pink elephant hovering over the mantelpiece.  What should it believe?  The point, 
frequently stressed by Fodor (e.g. (1983) p. 102), is that in deciding what to believe the 
system may draw on beliefs and information of many kinds, and that it need not – and 
should not – simply take the visual percept at face value.  For example, if you know that 
you tend to see pink elephants every new millennium (ok, year), and that the effect is 
closely scaled to your champagne consumption, you might well come to believe not that 
you are indeed seeing a pink elephant, but that you should cease partying.   
 
 Now this is not a problem, notice, for the input system that (in Fodor’s view) 
computed the visual image of the pink elephant in the first place.  Such  systems 
correspond, in Fodor’s cognitive architectural ontology, to modules, which can get by 
using good, old-fashioned (local, syntactic, Turing-friendly) methods of computation.  
Such modules can even, at times, compute results which depend on the global properties 
of the restricted data-base (for example, the “pink elephant” perception may have been 
the globally simplest interpretation of the whole set of data available to the visual 
processing system).    What matters is that the input systems can afford to rely on local, 
syntax (form) based operations.  This is fine in a module, which by definition (see Fodor 
(1983) p.  ) has an encapsulated and hence realistically navigable data-base.  The problem 
of what data to consider never arises since it is not fatal to assume that all the data, in the 
restricted module, is potentially relevant and to proceed accordingly.  Cognitive modules, 
with their encapsulated data-bases, thus do not confront the frame problem (as Fodor 
understands it) since: 
 
“Frame problems and relevance problems are about how deeply, in the 
course of cognitive processing, a mind should examine its background of 
epistemic commitments.  Modular problem solving doesn’t have to worry 
about that sort of thing because its searches are constrained 
architecturally; what is in the data-base can count … and nothing else 
counts as relevant.” 
Fodor (Ms) p. 61 
 
 The problem of global abductive inference is best appreciated against this 
backdrop.  It is the problem, in a super-compressed nutshell, of how to do inference to the 
best explanation in a way that is sensitive to whatever is most relevant in the massive 
body of belief and knowledge that underlies commonsense thinking and reasoning.  
Abductive reasoning, is, roughly, reasoning in which you explain, or understand, an 
event (an apparent event, in the pink elephant case) by coming up with the set of 
antecedent conditions which – given what you already know and believe – best account 
for the event.  For example, you find the ’phone off the hook and infer that the neighbor’s 
cat has once again invaded your apartment.  This conclusion is obviously not deductively 
implied by the evidence and your background beliefs.  But given the evidence and your 
background beliefs, it is the best explanation of the ’phone’s being off the hook.  Such 
modes of reasoning, as Peirce and others have persuasively argued, characterize both 
commonsense and scientific thought and reason.  Classical computational approaches 
confronted a major challenge, hereabouts.  Ordinary commonsense reasoning, as Dreyfus 
and others were quick to notice, seemed (and still seems) largely intractable given Turing 
style computational strategies.  The problem was two-fold: a problem of search, and a 
problem of “weighing.”  The problem of search was simply how to find, given a massive 
(indeed, seemingly boundless) set of explicit and implicit beliefs, the sub-set most 
relevant to the problem at hand.  The problem of ‘weighing’ was the problem, even given 
such a sub-set, of deciding which beliefs and items of knowledge to rely on the most.  
Peter Lipton (1991) thus divides (this version of) the frame problem into two 
subcomponents which he calls “epistemic filters.”  One filter negotiates the massive 
background data-base to generate candidate abductive explanations.  The other selects the 
best explanation from this set.  I’ll concentrate largely on the first filter, though the 
solution to this problem (as we’ll see) actually goes a long way towards solving the other  
problem as well. 
 
 The goal, then, is to directly address the worry that central cognition (defined as 
those processes especially implicated in commonsense and scientific thought and reason) 
relies heavily on abductive inference and that “reliable abduction may require, in the 
limit, that the whole background of epistemic commitments be somehow brought to bear 
in planning and belief fixation” (Fodor, (Ms) p. 37).  What gives this worry its practical 
bite is that, due to the local, syntactically-driven nature of Turing-style computation, 
“feasible abduction requires…that not more than a small subset of even the relevant 
background beliefs [be] actually consulted”.  The frame problem, for Fodor, just is the 
problem of “how to make abductive inferences that are both feasible and reliable” (quotes 
from Fodor (Ms) p. 37, emphasis mine). 
 
 This problem is, Fodor suspects, just about terminally embarrassing for familiar 
cognitive scientific accounts of central processing.  It explains, Fodor believes, our 
persistent inability to build a halfway decent household robot. This is no surprise if, as 
Fodor claims, “we don’t have a theory of commonsense reasoning that would survive 
scrutiny by an intelligent five year old” (Fodor (1998) p. 206)).  Some have thought – and 
not without reason – that Fodor is right about classical computational approaches but that 
connectionism (artificial neural networks) either sidesteps or solves the frame problem.  
But for once I (almost) agree with Fodor.  Connectionism doesn’t solve the problem, 
though it does relocate it in a potentially fruitful way.  In fact, it relocates it – as I’ll argue 
later on (section 3) – in exactly the right place for a neurologically plausible incarnation 
of the strategy I am about to describe.  First, though, let’s meet the strategy on its 
somewhat surprising home-ground: the problem of effective search in a dense 
hyperlinked environment.  Time, then, to consider the more familiar problem of 
navigating the world-wide web. 
 
2. Link Structures:  Using Implicit Knowledge to Tame the Web. 
The development of web search engines, along with the co-evolutionary 
explosion of web sites, has led to a problem with which we are all depressingly familiar.  
The information we need – the precise, exact thing we most need to know right now – is 
probably out there somewhere, packaged and waiting, but we just can’t find it.  Granted, 
there are many search engines:  but they seldom provide the fast, appropriate information 
retrieval we need.  Indeed, they often retrieve (even when used properly) voluminous 
junk, and have a regrettable tendency to miss the good stuff altogether.  There is a sense 
in which this is not surprising, for the problem they confront is formidable.  There are 
often literally millions of pages whose contents look superficially relevant – especially 
given that the usual test for relevance is dumb syntactic matching:  the search engine 
seeks pages that either contain, or are indexed as containing, tokens of the specific string 
or strings entered by the user.  The situation is worsened by the unplanned, anarchic 
nature of the web itself – there is little deliberate global organization of the kind that 
might be useful in streamlining search. 
 
Web-based search thus presents a familiar difficulty which Kleinberg dubs “the 
abundance problem”; 
The Abundance Problem:  The number of pages that could reasonably be 
returned as relevant is far too large for a human user to digest.  To 
provide effective search methods under these conditions, one needs a way 
to filter, from among a huge collection of relevant pages, a small set of the 
most “authoritative” or “definitive” ones. 
Kleinberg (1999) emphasis in original 
 
The abundance problem does not arise for more local, restricted kinds of search, 
where the number of returns from even a dumb syntax-based search remain tractable.  It 
is a problem only with global searches – ones confronting the whole WWW – since: 
Global approaches involve basic problem of representing and filtering 
large volumes of information… This is in contrast to local approaches 
[where] the amount of data is much smaller and…a different set of 
considerations dominates. 
Kleinberg (1999) p. 3 
 
Certain parallels between the problems outlined in Section 1 and the abundance 
problem for web-based search are already clear.  In each case there is a formidable body 
of potentially relevant data, yet we want a search procedure that retrieves only some 
especially relevant subset.  And in each case the problem is exacerbated by the dumb, 
purely local and syntactic nature of the mechanistic search procedures available.  Finally, 
there is a clear contrast, in each case, between procedures that, though dumb, local and 
syntax-driven, are good enough for searching restricted data-bases (encapsulated 
modules, sets of web pages belonging to a single site or intranet) and the kinds of 
procedures needed to tackle the more global case. 
The good news is that the abundance problem, at least, has a solution:  one 
currently the object of much ongoing research within the hypertext information retrieval 
community.  The key trick, it seems, is to focus attention not on the content of the pages 
so much as on the structure of links between pages.  The hyperlink structure itself – the 
way different pages link to and from each other – turns out to be a treasure house of 
implicit knowledge concerning which pages are most central and authoritative regarding 
a given topic.  Kleinberg’s achievement is to devise a set of algorithms that extract and 
utilize the knowledge thus implicit in the web of connectivity.  Formally, the algorithms 
construct a focused subgraph of the WWW and then exploit a number of additional tricks 
and heuristics to further sort and refine the results.  Interestingly, the actual contents of 
specific pages are consulted only in the very first stages of the complex procedure.  Most 
of the real work, as noted, depends purely on the analysis of the patterns of 
interconnectivity (link structure) between pages.  The search is thus entirely dumb and 
‘syntax-driven’ (in Fodor’s sense of syntax) but the relevant syntactic features are largely 
higher-order:  they concern the shape not of the knowledge-structures themselves but of 
the hyperlinks between them.  My suggestion – to be laid out in Section 3 following – 
will be that this trick (of looking at link structures rather than knowledge structures) is 
also exploited by biological brains and that it is what enables them to solve the 
formidable problems of search involved in global abductive inferences.  But first, let’s 
look at Kleinberg’s solution in a little more detail. 
 
Kleinberg begins by dividing the types of query a user might have into three broad 
types:  specific queries, such as “Does Netscape support the JDK 1.1. code signing API”, 
broad topic queries, such as “find information about Java”, and similar page queries, 
such as “find pages similar to java.sun.com”.  Specific queries are set aside, as they do 
not raise the abundance problem with which Kleinberg is concerned.  Broad topic queries 
are thus the main focus, but the same general procedure (of attending to hyperlink 
structure rather than primary content) turns out to have application to the similarity 
problem.  (Here again, there is non-accidental overlap with Fodor’s concerns: reasoning 
by analogy, Fodor (1983, p. 107) suggests, depends upon just the kind of process 
(intelligent search in a massive space) that is characteristic of both science and central 
systems, and about which cognitive science remains firmly in the dark). 
 
To illustrate the abundance problem, Kleinberg takes the simple query string 
“Harvard”.  It so happens that: 
there are over a million pages on the WWW that use the term “Harvard” 
and WWW.harvard.edu is not the one that uses the term most often, or 
most prominently, or in any way that would favor it under a text-based 
ranking function.  Indeed, one suspects there is no purely endogenous 
measure of the page that would allow one to properly assess its authority. 
Kleinberg (1999) p. 2 
 
Other examples:  to search for “search engines” – this is especially tough, since 
many of the most authoritative pages (Yahoo, Excite, Alta Vista) do not use the term on 
their home pages; to search for very broad topics, such as “censorship” – this tends to 
return a hodge-podge of largely non-authoritative sources, (ditto for searches such as 
“Gates”, seeking authoritative information about Bill Gates and Microsoft – again, the 
pages retrieved tend to be non-authoritative).  Standard searches thus tend to be both 
inefficient (return too much) and insufficiently intelligent (despite returning too much, 
they often miss – or return way down in the list – the most relevant and authoritative 
sites). 
 
Kleinberg’s procedure starts, nonetheless, with a dumb standard search.  It first 
collects – for some tractable number ò – the top ò highest ranked pages returned (for 
some broad query) by a standard search engine.  This is the only time text-based search is 
invoked, and it delivers a “root set R” of pages – a set which, we just argued is quite 
likely to fail to contain the pages in which we are in fact most interested.  The next step is 
to seek a set of pages that is, in fact, more likely to contain the pages we need.  The key 
assumption here is that the authoritative pages, though perhaps missing from the root set 
(the top ò pages returned by standard search) is probably at least pointed to by one or 
more pages in R.  R. is thus expanded to include any page pointed at by a page in R, and 
any page that points to a page in R (with some key restrictions to keep things 
manageable1). 
 
Now things get interesting.  What you have in hand is a directed graph G, in 
which nodes correspond to pages and directed edges reflect links between specific pages.  
Call the number of nodes a node is  linked to the “out-degree” of the node and the number 
of nodes that link to a node the “in-degree” of the node.  The question is how, by 
exploiting the link-structure information given by this directed graph, to discern the 
authoritative sources among the set of nodes (pages).  An obvious move is to consider the 
relative in-degrees of the nodes; a procedure which works as long as the most 
authoritative sources are the most widely indexed (have the greatest number of links – 
subject to the prunings mentioned in footnote 1 – to them). 
The trouble here is that mere popularity does not authority make.  Indeed, some 
sites are almost universally popular, and have enormous in-degrees regardless of topic:  
amazon.com is a prominent example.  Further filters are clearly required.  Kleinberg 
notes that if a site is indeed authoritative with respect to a query, we may expect not just 
that many other sites in G link to it, but that there be certain pages – “hub pages” – that 
have links to multiple relevant authoritative pages.  Good authorities, likewise, will be 
pointed to by multiple such “hub pages”.  The heart of Kleinberg’s procedure is an 
algorithm that computes, from the link structure of G, this mutually inter-defined set of 
hubs and authorities.  The algorithm works by computing the “eigenvectors of certain 
matrices associated with the link graph” (op cit, p. 1).  To fully display the algorithm 
requires the introduction of several notions from linear algebra, and I here refer the reader 
to the comprehensive account in Section 3 of Kleinberg’s paper.  Let us pause, though, to 
appreciate the results.  Here, for example, are the top search results for the query strings 
“java”, “censorship”, “search engines” and “Gates” (the numbers on the left indicate the 
overall strength of the “authoritativeness” rating): 
(java) Authorities 
.328 http://www.gamelan.com/ Gamelan 
.251 http:// java.sun.com/ JavaSoft Home Page 
.190 http:// www.digitalfocus.com/digitalfocus/faq/howdoi/html The Java Developer:How Do I… 
.190 http:// lightyear.ncsa.uiuc.edu/~srp/java/javabooks.html The Java Book Pages 
.183 http://sunsite.unc.edu/javafaq/javafaq.html comp.lang.java FAQ 
 
(censorship) Authorities 
.378 http://www.eff.org/ EFFweb – the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
.344 http://www.eff.org/blueribbon.html The Blue Ribbon Campaign for Online Free Speech  
.238 http://www.cdt.org/ The Center for Democracy and Technology 
.235 http://www.vtw.org/ Voters Telecommunications Watch 
.218 http:// www.aclu.org/ ACLU: American Civil Liberties Union 
 
(“search engines”) Authorities 
.346 http:// www.yahoo.com/ Yahoo! 
.291 http:// www.excite.com/ Excite 
.239 http:// www.mckinley.com/ Welcome to Magellan! 
.231 http:// www.lycos.com/ Lycos Home Page 
.231 http:// www.altavista.digital.com/ Alta Vista: Main Page 
 
(Gates) Authorities 
.643 http:// www.roadahead.com/ Bill Gates: The Road Ahead 
.458 http:// www.microsoft.com/ Welcome to Microsoft 
.4   40 http:// www.microsoft.com/corpinfo/bill-g.htm 
 
Kleinberg (1999) p. 11-12 
 
 
To compare this to text-based search, it is useful to note that almost none of these 
pages appeared in the root set R (the top ò pages returned by text-based search).  They 
instead first appeared in the subgraph G obtained by expanding the root set along the 
links that enter and leave it, and obtained prominence only by the further computation of 
likely hubs and authorities carried out using the fine-grained link structure information.  
In fact, the only single page in the above list that was returned by the original text-based 
search (as a member of R) was www.roadahead.com, returned as the 123rd choice of Alta 
Vista! 
Kleinberg stresses that almost all of this remarkably effective procedure operates 
by ignoring actual page content, focusing instead on the link structure alone.  It is this 
trick, of looking at the information-about-information (second-order information) implicit 
in the link structures that may help solve some aspects of the more general problem of 
global abductive inference.  What the shift to looking at secnd order information really 
does, I suggest, is to create a useful, low-dimensional reflection of the high-dimensional 
knowledge-space.  Kleinberg sums it up nicely: 
our algorithm produces pages that can legitimately be considered 
authoritative with respect to the WWW as a whole, despite the fact that it 
operates without direct access to any large-scale index of the WWW.  
Rather, its only “global” access to the WWW is through a text-based 
search engine such as Alta Vista, from which it is very difficult to directly 
obtain reasonable candidates for authoritative pages on most queries.  
What the results imply is that it is possible to reliably estimate certain 
types of global information about the WWW using only a standard search 
engine interface; a global analysis of the full WWW link structure can be 
replaced by a much more local method of analysis on a small focused 
subgraph. 
Kleinberg (1999) p. 12 
 
Kleinberg’s results are clearly impressive, and make significant headway with a 
very real and practical problem of global search.  But can they truly help us to understand 
how biological brains might be solving some of the puzzles highlighted in Section 1:  
puzzles which lie, we saw, somewhere in the vicinity of the infamous frame problem 
itself?  The answer, I’ll next argue, is a tentative but tantalizing ‘yes’. 
 
3. Neural Networks, Gating, and the Frame Problem Re-visited. 
Three hurdles stand in the way of any simple appeal to Kleinberg’s procedure 
(henceforth, KP) to solve the kinds of problems about human cognition highlighted in 
Section 1.  They are: 
(1) The fact that KP is defined over familiar symbolic encodings of information 
(web pages), whereas biological information storage plausibly involves 
quite different modes of encoding. 
(2) The relative balance, in the problems targeted in Section 1, between issues 
concerning search and retrieval and issues concerning the evaluation of the 
information retrieved (Lipton’s “second filter”). 
and 
(3) The role of human intelligence and intuition in setting up the link structures 
on which KP depends (perhaps it is only because human brains can already 
solve the frame problem that we can set up the link structures that allow KP 
to work, thus rendering KP circular as a solution to the frame problem). 
 
I shall address each worry in turn.  First, then, the question of the knowledge 
structures over which KP operates.  These are familiar (indeed, paradigmatic) symbolic 
encodings.  Yet the biological brain, many of us believe, eschews such symbol-
mongering in favor of various kinds of distributed, neural population based encoding.  
Some have argued, in fact, that once you move to this kind of encoding (and processing) 
system, the frame problem as Fodor imagines it simply does not arise.  If this is true, KP 
is cognitively spurious.  If it is false (it is false), we will need to see whether KP can also 
get a grip in a more “connectionist” kind of setting. 
 
Does a broadly connectionist approach to encoding and processing already solve 
(Fodor’s version of) the frame problem?  That version, recall, was at heart a problem 
about non-demonstrative inference and the potency of abductive reason in the context of 
a large, non-modular knowledge-base.  More precisely, that part of the problem with 
which we are concerned is what Haselager (1997) calls the descriptive and computational 
part viz “how part of what one knows influences what one ends up believing” (op cit, p. 
105).  Paul Churchland, however, has suggested that this aspect of the frame problem, at 
least, is nicely taken care of by the adoption of an alternative (“connectionist”) mode of 
encoding and retrieval.  In Churchland’s view: 
“the depiction of one’s knowledge as an immense set of individually 
stored “sentences” raises a severe problem concerning…relevant 
retrieval…How is it one is able to retrieve, from the millions of sentences 
stored, exactly the handful that is relevant to one’s current predictive or 
explanatory problem, and how is it one is generally able to do this in a few 
tenths of a second?  This is known as the “frame problem” in AI and it 
arises because…a long list of sentences is an appallingly inefficient way 
to store information.” 
P.M. Churchland (1989) p. 155-56 
 
Connectionist networks – and, let us assume for the sake of argument2, the brain – 
store information in a radically different way.  A full, or even adequate, account of all this 
would be out of place here (see e.g. Clark (1989)(1993) or Churchland (1989)(1995)).  
But the key features that are supposed to help solve the frame problem are easily 
explained.  Connectionist networks replace serial search with spreading activation in a 
massively parallel system.  Within that system, knowledge is stored not as discrete 
symbolic strings but as weights between unstructured nodes.  The weights (numerical 
quantities, positive and negative, which differentially affect the flow and strength of node 
activations) allow the system to retrieve information in the form of activity-vectors across 
a whole population of nodes.  Such retrieval is typically fast and nicely tuned to the 
impinging stimulus (retrieval cue).  Thus suppose the retrieval cue is a visual input as of a 
kitchen full of smoke.  Spreading activation through a massively parallel network is what 
allows us, according to Churchland, to understand “at a glance why…the kitchen is filled 
with smoke:  the toast is burning!” (Churchland (1989) p. 199).  It is worth dwelling on 
the proposal.  The idea is that the frame problem, conceived as a problem of “speed-of-
relevant-access” (op cit, p. 178) is directly solved by the connectionist approach.  Here is 
the passage in full: 
“A network the size of a human brain – with 1011 neurons, 103 connection 
on each, 1014 total connections, and at least 10 distinct layers of hidden 
units – can be expected, in the course of growing up, to partition its 
internal vector spaces into many billions of functionally relevant 
subdivisions, each responsive to a broad but proprietary range of highly 
complex stimuli.  When the network receives a stimulus that falls into one 
of these classes, the network produces the appropriate activation vector in 
a matter of only tens or hundreds of milliseconds, because that is all the 
time it take for the parallel-coded stimulus to make its way through only 
two or three or ten layers of the massively parallel network to the 
functionally relevant layer that drives the appropriate behavioral response.  
Since information is stored not in a long list that must somehow be 
searched, but rather in the myriad connection weights that configure the 
network, relevant aspects of the creature’s total information are 
automatically accessed by the coded stimuli themselves. 
 
The problem, I think, should be clear.  In order to press a solution to the frame 
problem so directly from connectionist encodings, Churchland has had to innocently rig 
the game.  He has assumed that first, the brain is already divided into “billions of 
functionally relevant subdivisions” and second, that each such subdivision gets to “see” 
the current stimulus so as to have the chance to (as it were) resonate to it or not.  But 
neither assumption, it seems to me, is realistic.  The choice of billions of relevant 
subdivisions is not accidental.  Churchland is not here imagining a few thousand neuro-
anatomically distinct areas (a more realistic bet):  he is imagining enough functionally 
distinct subdivisions (not necessarily neuro-anatomically distinct) to devote a single 
subdivision to each distinct and integrated body of knowledge we possess.  In that 
respect, the solution exploits something not unlike good old fashioned frames (Minsky 
(1975)) or scripts (Schank and Abelson (1975)), but with the additional resource of 
connectionist (parallel, distributed) encoding and retrieval.  But there are familiar 
problems here.  Either there are uncountably many such subdivisions, with massive re-
duplication of information, or the ones that exist are densely cross-referenced.  It is 
uncontentious, I believe, that the latter is the only practical possibility.  But as Fodor is 
not slow to notice, there is in that case: 
No reason to doubt that…the system of cross-referencing would imply a 
graph in which there is a route…from each point to any other.  But now 
we have the frame problem all over again:  Which such paths should 
actually be traversed in a given case of problem-solving…?  All that has 
happened is that, instead of thinking of the frame problem as an issue in 
the logic of confirmation, we are now invited to think of it as an issue in 
the theory of executive control… 
Fodor (1983) p. 117 
 
It may seem as if the connectionist solution sidesteps this problem by allowing all 
the brain’s knowledge-level resources a chance to be “automatically accessed by the 
coded stimuli” (see earlier quote).  But this is not at all the case.  Instead, incoming 
information is rapidly routed, filtered and transformed as it flows around the brain.  The 
incoming stimulus is simply not encountered by most of our neural resources.  Instead, 
information flows in a way which is well-suited (typically) to the problem at hand.  What 
Fodor calls the problem of “executive control” – I’ll just call it the “routing problem” – is 
thus where the frame problem, in connectionist guise, spills out from under the rug.  Get 
the flow of information-retrieving information (stimulus cues, suitably transformed) right, 
and connectionist modes of encoding and storage do indeed result in gains of speed and 
efficiency.  But what modulates the flow?  Something more is needed.  Something simple 
connectionist models do not – pace Churchland’s optimistic prognosis – provide (for a 
similar diagnosis, see Haselager (1997, Chapter 5) and Fodor (Ms, Chapter 3). 
 
What is needed, I suggest, is some combination of (i) a certain kind of second-
generation connectionist architecture (see below) and (ii) the exploitation, within such an 
architecture, of the kind of second-order (link-structure) information highlighted in KP.  
Here’s what I have in mind. 
Van Essen et al (1994) is a neuroscientifically plausible, connectionist-style 
account that describes “an explicit mechanism for dynamically regulating the flow of 
information within and between cortical areas” (op cit, p. 271).  Such a mechanism is 
required, we are told, due to: 
Computational considerations relating to (1) the vast amounts of data 
continuously impinging on the nervous system, (2) the finite 
computational resources that can be dedicated to any given task and (3) 
the need for highly flexible linkages between a large number of physically 
separate modules. 
Van Essen et al (1994) p. 271 
 
What Van Essen and his colleagues offer, in fact, is a working, neurobiologically 
plausible model which accounts for the way appropriate information is channeled to the 
right functional subdivisions of cortex at the right time.  They are thus proposing a 
solution to the problem which – I suggested – afflicts Churchland’s appeal to 
connectionism as a means of dissolving the frame problem.  At the heart of Van Essen et 
al’s picture is the idea that many neurons and neuronal populations serve not as direct 
encodings of knowledge or information, but as (dumb) middle managers routing and 
trafficking the internal flow of information between and within cortical areas.  These 
“control neurons” serve to open and close channels of activity, and allow for the creation 
of a kind of instantaneous, context-sensitive modular cortical architecture:  control 
neurons weave functional models “on the hoof”, in a way sensitive to the effects of 
context, attention and so on.  Van Essen et all develop a detailed, connectionist model of 
simple versions of such circuits.  Related proposals include Edelman and Mountcastle’s 
work on “reentrant processing” in which feedback and feedforward pathways are used to 
control and co-ordinate activity in multiples sites, and Damasio and Damasio’s (1994) 
notion of “convergence zones”, which are neuronal populations which likewise initiate 
and co-ordinate activity in multiple neuronal groups.  It is worth noting that in none of 
these cases are the routing and co-ordinating circuits themselves highly intelligent 
problem-solving homunculi:  instead, they are themselves just more, relatively dumb, 
connectionist-style resources.  How, then, do they get the routings right?  In the case of 
Van Essen et al’s “Shifter circuits” (the circuits in which control neurons route incoming 
information) the required knowledge (about what inputs to send where and when to do 
so) is presumed to be innate.  This is perhaps plausible in the case of some aspects of 
visual attention, recognition and motor control (the targets of their simple model).  But it 
is less plausible for higher level cognition:  a domain in which they nonetheless comment 
that: 
It requires only a modest conceptual leap to suppose that analogous 
routing strategies may be used to control the flow of information in 
whatever central structures are used to represent semantic information and 
other high-level abstractions that are the coinage of cognitive function. 
Van Essen et al (1994) p. 298 
 
As things stand, however, the modest leap looks a trifle immodest:  a touch 
flagrant, if it requires that this routing information be innate, and a touch mysterious 
(given the absence of a mechanism for learning appropriate routings) if not. 
 
Perhaps KP can be of help.  The problem, it seems, is how to learn, given a 
developing, experience-driven core of worldly knowledge, what aspects of that 
knowledge should be pulled together into an instantaneous, soft-wired module, given a 
specific current stimulus or input.  As we saw, the stimulus itself must indeed do some of 
the work here:  it must effectively select, without the intervention of intelligent middle-
managers, a set of sub-populations of neurons to which to present its case.  What this 
corresponds to, in the case of web-based search, is the need to create – on-the-hoof – a 
suitably restricted subgraph (G) of the web.  As Fodor puts it, it is thus “unstable 
instantaneous connectivity that counts” (1983, p. 118) – connectivity that “changes from 
moment to moment as dictated by the interaction between the program that is being 
executed and the structure of the task in hand” (op cit). 
 
KP goes some way towards showing how this might be achieved.  The first step, 
recall, is to allow a relatively dumb process to activate an artificially limited set of 
knowledge structures:  pages in KP, functional subdivisions of cortex in the neural case.  
These resources will be far, far from adequate, but may at least be presumed to have links 
to the resources (pages, knowledge-structures) we really need to recruit.  At this point KP 
proper kicks in, operating not on the content of these first-pass-identified resources, but 
on their second-order properties:  this is the link-structure information, in the web case, 
and the patterns of larger-scale associative links in the neural case (still assuming a 
broadly connectionist encoding).  These second-order features are a tractable search 
object, and afford a kind of content-free sparse image of the organization of the 
associative links leading to and from the first-pass-identified resources (the knowledge 
structures in the root set R).  Using this information, a neural implementation of KP could 
then identify a much better set of resources (knowledge-structures) – the neural analogues 
to the “hubs and authorities” (see Section 2 above) relevant given a certain input.  
 
The first-pass search (which, in KP, used a standard text-based search engine 
constrained to deliver only a fixed number (ò) of returns) corresponds, I suggest to the 
simplest kind of connectionist retrieval mode – the kind appealed to by Churchland.  It 
identifies some neural populations that resonate to the stimulus, but – given that the input 
cannot be shown to the whole brain, and given the relatively dumb, pattern-matching 
nature of the search – it is not expected that the resources we most need to recruit will 
always be discovered at this stage.  Instead, something like link-structure information will 
often need to be used, in a second-pass search, to identify (without yet accessing any 
actual knowledge-structures) a better set of resources (corresponding to the subgraph G) 
whose  link structure patterns allow the identification of hubs and authorities. 
 
The big question, obviously, is can the biological brain actually compute the kind 
of link-structure (associative link-structure) information needed to drive something like 
KP.  The immediate problem is again one of locality.  If we eschew – as I think we must 
– the image of a kind of overseeing executive in the brain, able to obtain link-structure 
information by direct inspection, then we need to understand how locally-driven kinds of 
spreading activation might nonetheless be sensitive to information implicit in the higher 
level pattern of links itself.  What KP provides is a nice existence proof that if some 
relevant analogue to link-structure information is available, it can be used to make truly 
important inroads into the search-based aspects of the frame problem and the problem of 
abductive inference.  This is itself a highly significant result, and reason enough, I 
believe, to take very seriously the project of discovering a locally-computable means of 
identifying and exploiting the information implicit in large-scale patterns of 
connectivity3. 
 
So far, then, I hope to have shown two things.  First, that there is enough 
similarity between the abundance and relevance problems in web-based search and 
certain aspects of the frame problem to make it worthwhile considering a solution to the 
former (KP) as at least suggestive of (part of) a solution to the latter.  And second, that 
although KP is designed with a symbolic processing environment in mind, it is possible 
to imagine connectionist-style versions of the strategy:  versions which would combine 
the idea of gating and control neurons with the use of higher order link-structure 
information.  In the next section, I turn to the 2nd and 3rd worries outlined at the start of 
this section, viz the balance between search and evaluation, and the threat of circularity. 
 
4. Search, Circularity, and Analogical Reasoning. 
The problem of global abductive inference (and, more generally, the frame 
problem itself) comprises two distinct elements.  There is an element of search:  the 
system must find and access the bodies of stored knowledge which are most germane to 
the task in hand.  And there is an element of evaluation:  the system must decide how to 
use, amend, weight or value the information thus retrieved.  One possible worry about the 
use of second-order link-structure information to access and identify the most relevant 
bodies of stored knowledge is that it leaves this latter problem unresolved. 
 
A simple response would be to accept that something like KP can help, at most, 
with the search element of the (global abductive reasoning version of) the frame problem.  
That would itself be a non-trivial contribution.  But in fact, I think things look a little 
better.  A lot depends, however, on exactly how we conceive of the remaining problem.  
Fodor (1983, p. 101-119) distinguishes the two aspects of the problem by analogy with 
two features of the nondemonstrative fixation of belief in science.  The first feature, 
corresponding to the issue of search, is dubbed “isotropy”.  Belief fixation is isotropic if 
the relevant facts may come from anywhere in a global knowledge-base.  In science, 
Fodor suggests, anything may turn out to be relevant to anything (bacteria to sunspots, 
etc.).  And similarly in individual belief fixation:  you cannot know in advance what is 
relevant to what, hence the need to search, hence the frame problem.  The second feature, 
corresponding to the issue of evaluation, is being “Quinean”.  In a Quinean system, the 
degree of confirmation of a belief is sensitive to properties of the entire belief system.  
Fodor’s favorite example (see, e.g. (1983) p. 108) is simplicity.  We prefer belief X over 
belief Y because X yields a simpler account.  But simplicity here cannot be measured by 
any intrinsic properties of X, or by any properties of its encoding or expression (how 
many sentences it takes to state X, etc.).  Instead, we call X simpler if it causes least 
disruption to, and makes most sense of, the overall set of things we believe.  But to know 
that we must somehow be looking at, or sensitive to, the whole belief system.  Another 
daunting, frame-problem redolent task. 
 
Fodor seems to imagine that the second problem (the evaluation problem) 
requires us to again confront the entire knowledge-base.  I am not positive that Fodor 
thinks this, but it certainly looks that way.  He writes, for example that “the shape of our 
whole science bears on the epistemic status of each scientific hypothesis” (op cit, p. 107).  
So one might expect the shape of my whole belief system to bear on my evaluation of the 
information isolated by KP, or by any other mechanism that successfully confronts the 
problem of global search. 
 
But this seems wrong.  Fodor himself accepts that there is “considerable 
evidence”4 that “potentially relevant considerations are often systematically ignored…in 
favor of relatively local…strategies” (op cit, p. 116).  One way to explain such evidence 
is this:  we deploy a moderately reliable procedure to access a delimited subset of 
knowledge in a problem-solving situation (I have suggested that KP simply reveals a 
crucial “missing trick” hereabouts).  But subsequent evaluation, amendment and action-
choice, etc. is then sensitive only to the knowledge thus accessed.  The evaluation 
problem, thus construed, is not to be solved by again confronting the entire knowledge 
base.  And in the delimited case, it is possible (as Fodor allows) to imagine various 
heuristic devices for assessing simplicity, elegance, etc.  Fodor’s mistake (see his (1983) 
p. 11) is to depict the evaluation options as exhausted by 1) the confrontation (again) of 
the entire knowledge base or 2) the confrontation of an “arbitrarily delimited” (op cit, p. 
111, emphasis in original) subset of knowledge.  The reason a procedure like KP can help 
with both the search and evaluation problems is because it delivers a non-arbitrary subset 
of data over which to define simpler syntactic measures of simplicity, elegance, etc.. 
 
In discussing these issues, Fodor considers and rejects one way of delimiting the 
set of data viz the appeal to something like “frames” or “scripts”5.  The hope, which 
Fodor finds forlorn, was that such devices might help by “placing a frame around the 
body of information that gets called when a given sort of problem is encountered” (op cit, 
p. 116).  But the trouble, as we noted earlier, is that either such frames and scripts are all 
pre-fixed, ready for every possible problem, or the relevant frames needed to be 
assembled on the hoof.  The former looks impossible while the latter simply recapitulates 
the problem of identifying the relevant information at the right time.  What results is, as 
Fodor says, a relocation of the problem as one of “executive control” (op cit, p. 117).  But 
we can now see that the contribution of KP is, precisely, a solution to that relocated 
problem.  KP provides a mechanism which allows you to build, on-the-hoof, a temporary 
module over which to define local processes of reasoning and evaluation.  It creates the 
“unstable, instantaneous connectivity” (op cit, p. 118) which allows local processes to 
access, evaluate and amend just the knowledge structures most relevant to the task at 
hand.  And it does so without itself re-encountering the frame problem.  Fodor’s general 
worry, about heuristic-based means of delimiting the set of resources to consider, is that it 
may require global abductive inference of the same problematic kind in order to decide 
which local heuristics to employ (see Fodor (Ms) p. 41).  KP neatly sidesteps this 
problem, by providing a universally appropriate fast and frugal heuristic viz the 
identification of hubs and authorities via the use of link-structure information.  What KP 
offers is, I believe, a kind of general-purpose, inward-looking “fast and frugal heuristic” 
to join the potent group of specialized heuristics treated in e.g. Gigerenzer and Todd 
(1999). 
 
I turn now to the third and final problem mentioned earlier:  the threat of 
circularity in any attempt to invoke a KP-like procedure in the explanation of individual 
human reasoning.  Kleinberg himself notes that the reason attention to the hyperlink 
structure patterns among web pages can help solve the abundance problem is that 
“hyperlinks encode a considerable amount of latent human judgment” and thus carry 
implicit information about authoritative sources (Kleinberg (1999) p. 2).  This may sound 
worrying.  If it takes frame-problem solving humans to set up the hyperlink patterns that 
KP relies on, don’t we need a frame-problem solving homunculus in the head to set up 
the connectivity patterns which would then likewise carry (in the brain) implicit 
information about what is most relevant to what?  The answer is no, we don’t.  Here’s 
why. 
 
Consider once again the case of hyperlinks in the WWW.  And notice, first, that 
no single designer put that hyperlink structure in place.  Instead, there are many 
thousands of individuals, each pursuing somewhat different local projects, who find it 
(each for their own local reasons) useful to set up links.  Some of those individuals find it 
useful to set up links to sites with better links to sites of common interest.  And certain 
sites will thus be both heavily linked to other sites and from other sites.  This leads to the 
emergence of what Kleinberg calls “hubs”.  Moreover, the reason a site becomes a hub is 
typically because it is linked to many truly authoritative sites.  Hence the co-definition, in 
Kleinberg’s system, of hubs and authorities.  What I want to stress is that despite the role 
of human thought in setting up individual hyperlinks, the overall patterns that KP exploits 
have emerged, even in the web case, as a result of a (globally) blind, self-organizing  
process.  In each case the links are created by thoroughly local processes, none of which 
itself has access to the overall pattern of events.  What KP then does is to exploit 
information left implicit in such emergent structuring so as to better access the subset of 
knowledge-structures most likely to be relevant to a specific situation. 
 
The worry about circularity is thus ungrounded.  The link-structures emerge, in 
both web and brain, as a result of local decisions made on the basis of purely local 
interests and knowledge.  What results, however, is a larger pattern of connectivity which 
is itself the repository of valuable search-sculpting information.  The key to effectively 
searching the web, and (if I am right) to solving a significant fraction of the frame 
problem itself, lies in the efficient exploitation of this implicit information. 
 
This same link-structure information can, Kleinberg notes, be used in other ways.  
A natural extension of KP, implemented and tested by Kleinberg, uses link-structure 
information to discover web pages that are similar to some target page.  In this case, there 
is no explicit query-string which can be used to identify the root set of pages from which 
to trace the in and out degrees of links.  It is possible, however, to use KP to identify the 
strongest authorities in the local link structures leading into and out of the target page.  
One amends the root-set generating operation and proceeds as before – specifically, the 
operation of identifying a set number ò of pages containing a target syntactic item (the 
original query string) is replaced by an operation that finds ò pages that point to the 
target page.  With this foot in the hyperlink-structure door, KP can go on to find hubs and 
authorities in the local region of the target page.  Here are the results obtained when the 
target page (the page such that you are seeking “similar” pages) is www.honda.com: 
(www.honda.com) Authorities 
.202 http://www.toyota.com/ Welcome to @Toyota 
.199 http://www.honda.com/ Honda 
.192 http://www.ford.com Ford Motor Company 
.173 http://www.bmwusa.com/ BMW of North America, Inc. 
.162 http:// www.volvocars.com/ VOLVO 
.158 http:// www.saturncars.com/ Welcome to the Saturn Web Site 
.155 http://www.nissanmotors.com/ NISSAN – ENJOY THE RIDE 
.145 http://www.audi.com/ Audi Homepage 
.139 http://www.4adodge.com/ 1997 Dodge Site 
.136 http://www.chryslercars.com/ Welcome to Chrysler 
 
To fully appreciate what has here been achieved, reflect that most of these firms 
will deliberately not mention each other by name or include direct links to each others 
pages.  Indeed, as Kleinberg (op cit, p. 14) notes, many of these pages contain very little 
text (mostly images) and the text they do contain shows very little overlap.  Yet the large 
hyperlink structure (of links into and out of the pages) contains enough pattern to allow 
KP, without ever accessing any of the content of the pages, to spot the similarities. 
 
It is tempting to speculate (and I hereby give in to temptation) that the close 
relation between the usefulness of KP in solving a frame-problem related global search 
problem and its usefulness in driving a process of similarity-based retrieval is far from 
accidental.  For the identification of deep similarities between bodies of knowledge that 
currently lack short, direct interlinkages looks central to the more general process of 
analogical reasoning.  And analogical reasoning, as Fodor likes to remind us, often seems 
to exhibit: 
isotropy in the purest form:  a process which depends precisely upon the 
transfer of information among cognitive domains previously assumed to 
be mutually irrelevant. 
Fodor (1983) p. 107 
 
Concerning analogical reasoning, Fodor then asserts that “nobody knows 
anything about how it works” (op cit, p. 107) and thence proceeds quickly to the 
infamous First Law of the non-existence of Cognitive Science (see Introduction, above).  
Although I think Fodor is quite wrong to assert that Cognitive Science has no good ideas 
about analogical reason, I do suspect that KP offers a useful new insight, by once again 
drawing attention to the possible role of second-order (link structure) information in 
informing a search for “similar items”. 
 
Other possible extensions of KP include the use of additional kinds of second-
order information.  (I am calling information second-order when it is not information 
about the contents of pages or knowledge-structures, but about features of the content-
bearers themselves – in particular, for KP the way the pages are linked together).  Other 
kinds of second-order information that might be invoked thus include information about 
“patterns of traffic” (Kleinberg, op cit, p. 28) ie the way users are moving around the 
hyperlinked resources, rather than the shape of the links themselves.  In the neural case, 
these may be closely related, with patterns of traffic (propagations of activity) actually 
creating and modifying the link structures themselves.  In fact, KP may be just scraping 
the surface of a large realm of types and uses of such second-order information. 
 
5. Conclusions:  A Second-Order Path From Associations to Reason? 
At rock bottom, Fodor ((1983) (Ms)) is worried about three things.  He is worried 
that commonsense reason and abductive inference seems to depend on currently 
intractable searches of our entire belief-set, or “background of epistemic commitments” 
(Ms, p. 38).  He is worried that sensitivity to local syntactic features is thus often quite 
insufficient for reasoned response (op cit).  And he is worried that appeals to search-
reducing heuristics and to associative links between knowledge items at best simply re-
position the problem (which then becomes one of knowing which heuristics to use, or 
which associative links to follow), again posing an apparently intractable problem of 
search.  That these problems are so closely related as to be pretty much of a piece is 
admitted on all sides.  The common core is the intractability of global search, and it is this 
intractability that is celebrated in both the frame problem and in Fodor’s first law of the 
non-existence of Cognitive Science. 
 
But the seeds of an algorithmically tractable solution now exist, or so I have 
claimed, in the (perhaps unlikely) form of a powerful new procedure (Kleinberg, 1999) 
for searching the web.  The procedure (here called KP) sidesteps, whenever possible, the 
attempt to consult the actual contents of web pages (or stored knowledge structures).  
Instead, it is driven mainly by second-order information concerning patterns of 
hyperlinks.  The general moral of KP – that information merely implicit in the actual link-
structures can be put to valuable work – is, I argued, as applicable to models of individual 
reason as it is to the web.  Nor is it restricted to symbolic models of individual reason – in 
fact, it comports quite well with recent neuro-connectionist work on “gating” and 
“routing”, by suggesting an additional layer of information that might be used to fluidly 
regulate and switch information flow within a complex web of neural populations. 
 
The proposal, viewed in the broadest possible way, is thus to bootstrap an 
associative engine into a full-blooded engine of reason, not by adding new kinds of 
resources but by better exploiting the information already contained in the associative 
links.  KP, thus viewed, shows how to exploit second-order information concerning 
patterns of linkage so as to cheaply identify the knowledge-structures most likely to be 
relevant given a specific input.  It is precisely this kind of trick that the developmentalist 
Annette Karmiloff-Smith (see footnote 5) has in mind when she depicts human thought as 
the beneficiary of an especially effective procedure for making increasingly efficient use 
of an original array of merely implicit information.  But whereas Karmiloff-Smith and 
others (myself included) have previously focused attention on the contents of the 
knowledge-structures themselves, KP invites us to look at the information implicit in the 
organization of those structures.  This organization is, I have stressed, the result of 
multiple locally-based ‘decisions’, and is created without the intervention of any central 
executive.  The proposal is thus that information left implicit by an ongoing process of 
distributed self-organization may need to be targeted and exploited by other (local, self-
organizing) processes so as to turbo-charge processes of reason, recall and adaptive 
response. 
 
KP is also an example of technology recapitulating phylogeny:  a case where the 
development of web-based search first raises, then begins to solve, a problem deeply 
analogous to one first encountered by biological brains in the course of cognitive 
evolution.  Fodor’s pessimism hereabouts is famous:  concerning global search and 
reason “cognitive science hasn’t even started; we are literally no further advanced than 
we were in the darkest days of behaviorism” (1983, p. 129).  But look yonder – is that 
just a web browser shimmering softly, or a glimmer of light in the hyperlinked gloom? 
                                                 
1 One page in R is allowed to bring only some set number of new pages into view, and links between pages 
with the same domain name (“the first level in the URL string associated with a page”) are ignored, as 
these typically serve merely “navigational” functions within one larger document.  The only links that are 
of interest are thus what Kleinberg calls “transverse links” – links between pages with different domain 
names.  These and a few additional heuristics are described in Kleinberg (1999) p. 6-7. 
2 Suppose that this is wrong, and that the brain (in the kinds of case Fodor considers) uses sentence-like 
symbolic encodings?  In that case, the applicability of something like KP seems evenless problematic.  In 
making the connectionist assumption I am thus making my task much harder.   
3 What is needed is, in fact, something closely akin to what Anette Karmiloff-Smith (1986) (1992) terms a 
mechanism of “representational redescription”.  But whereas Karmiloff-Smith imagines that what gets re-
described is an actual knowledge-structure, and that these get redescribed in ways that make explicit what 
was previously implicit in the knowledge-structure, what I am imagining is a mechanism which makes 
explicit the information that was previously implicit in whole patterns of connectivity between knowledge-
structures.  (In the connection setting, in which knowledge is in any case encoded in patterns of weighed 
connections, this is actually a difference more of focus than of kind).  Now imagine a neural network 
which targets not the outside world, but the activities of other neural networks.  What the net cares about, 
let’s assume, is the pattern of temporal relations between activity patterns in different neuronal populations.  
Over time, such a network will come to encode a kind of low-dimensional image of large-scale patterns of 
connectivity between knowledge-structures in the brain – it will learn to predict, for example, that 
activation in such-and-such a population typically leads to activation in such-and-such other areas.  Such 
knowledge might allow such networks to learn to perform the kinds of gating function Van Essen et al 
describe, in a way that now speaks directly to the search-based aspect of the frame problem itself.  Notice, 
finally, that it would be targeted on the higher-order feature of inner connectivity, and its output would 
open and close channels so as to create the kind of instantaneous module described in the text.  Thornton 
(2000) describes an approach to “supercharged” learning that looks potentially relevant to this general 
project. 
4 Fodor cites Nisbett and Ross (1980), and Kuhn (1970) 
5 A script, for example, encodes a body of information concerning the stereotypical course of events in 
some daily situation (e.g. a visit to a restaurant) – see Schank and Abelson (1975).  For frames, see Minsky 
(1975). 
